

Reorganizing the 7th Civil Support Command in Europe

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 03-12-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reorganizing the 7 th Civil Support Command in Europe				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Alan K. Schrews				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. John A. Bonin Department of Academic Affairs				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution: A					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The 7th Civil Support Command located in Kaiserslautern, Germany is the only Army Reserve command entirely stationed on foreign soil. Since 2008, the command has transformed from an administrative command to a deployable operational command specializing in Foreign Consequence Management. Currently, the 7th Civil Support Command's major capabilities are provided by civil affairs units, civil support teams, and a deployable headquarters element. With the possibility of deployment due to a foreign consequence management incident relatively low, the 7th Civil Support Command should be reorganized as a critical enabler for the European and African theater of operations capable of handling a variety of mission sets. In a time of decreasing fiscal budgets, this reorganization expands the array of contingencies that the 7th Civil Support Command can respond and will be an efficient use of resources.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Consequence Management, Army Reserve, USAREUR					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

REORGANIZING THE 7TH CIVIL SUPPORT COMMAND IN EUROPE

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Alan K. Schrews
TITLE: Reorganizing the 7th Civil Support Command in Europe
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 12 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 5924 PAGES: 30
KEY TERMS: Foreign Consequence Management, Army Reserve, USAREUR
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The 7th Civil Support Command located in Kaiserslautern, Germany is the only Army Reserve command entirely stationed on foreign soil. Since 2008, the command has transformed from an administrative command to a deployable operational command specializing in Foreign Consequence Management. Currently, the 7th Civil Support Command's major capabilities are provided by civil affairs units, civil support teams, and a deployable headquarters element. With the possibility of deployment due to a foreign consequence management incident relatively low, the 7th Civil Support Command should be reorganized as a critical enabler for the European and African theater of operations capable of handling a variety of mission sets. In a time of decreasing fiscal budgets, this reorganization expands the array of contingencies that the 7th Civil Support Command can respond and will be an efficient use of resources.

REORGANIZING THE 7TH CIVIL SUPPORT COMMAND IN EUROPE

We will likely not call the future exactly right, but we must think through the nature of continuity and change in strategic trends to discern their military implications to avoid being completely wrong. These implications serve to influence the concepts that drive our services' adaptations to the environments within which they will operate, adaptations that are essential if our leaders are to have the fewest regrets when future crises strike.

—General J.N. Mattis¹

In tough economic times, the budgetary resources of the Department of Defense are frequently a target for reduction. With a focus on effectiveness and efficiency, the military must get the most mission accomplishment out of each dollar appropriated. In other words, the military has to do more with less. This efficiency mindset should cause leaders at all levels of command within the military to question why and how the resources entrusted to them by the nation are used. What are the tasks that we are not doing that we should be doing? In addition, what are the tasks that we are doing that we should not be doing? While these are only a couple of basic questions, they can lead to the discovery of efficiencies necessary for the fiscal health of the military and the nation. With that being said, an appropriate organizational structure and mission can lead to an effective and efficient use of resources.

Purpose of the Research

This Strategic Research Project examines and critiques the current structure and mission of the 7th Civil Support Command and then proposes changes that will enhance its capabilities of handling a variety of mission sets for the Theater Army. Among the recommendations discussed are changes to the command's name, adjustment in mission focus to stability operations, using the 7th Civil Support Command

headquarters as a second Theater Army Contingency Command Post, and conversion of the 196th Medical Support Units into a deployable medical capability. Other recommendations discussed include improvements to mission command such as activation of a Regional Support Group, use of National Guard weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams (WMD-CST) for overseas contingencies, inactivation of excess training capacity represented by the 7th Warrior Training Brigade, and activation of a Theater Engagement Battalion. In the end, the results of the transformation will be a command that is uniquely postured to execute a variety of stability operations missions for the Theater Army and be an effective and efficient use of resources for the nation.

History of the 7th Civil Support Command

The 7th Civil Support Command is an Army Reserve command located in Europe. It is the only Army Reserve command entirely stationed on foreign soil. The command traces its lineage back to four Army Reserve schools formed in Europe in 1956. Army Reserve Soldiers served in Europe in a number of different capacities and structures until the 7th Army Reserve Command activated in 1986.² The 7th Army Reserve Command provided an administrative headquarters for Army Reserve units supporting United States Army – Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army. Every unit within the 7th Army Reserve Command was attached to a regular army headquarters in USAREUR for operations and training.³ Therefore, operational control was through the active army and administrative control was through the 7th Army Reserve Command.⁴

Throughout the years, 7th Army Reserve Command units have been an integral part of USAREUR's success in a number of operations from Operation Joint Guard to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom.

As USAREUR has transformed, so has the 7th Army Reserve Command. In 2005, the Army decided to transform the 7th Army Reserve Command from an administrative headquarters to a deployable operational command with foreign consequence management, civil support, and civil affairs capability not currently resident in USAREUR. The 7th Civil Support Command assumed provisional status on 1 October 2008 and activated on 1 October 2009. As part of the transformation, the headquarters moved from Tompkins Barracks, Schwetzingen, Germany to Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, Germany in the summer of 2008.

Current 7th Civil Support Command Structure and Organization

The 7th Civil Support Command primary capabilities are in the areas of foreign consequence management, civil affairs, and civil support teams. The command is authorized 962 Soldiers assigned to a headquarters company and 22 subordinate units. The headquarters provides a deployable operational element capable of conducting interface during a United States government response to a consequence management incident. A brigadier general commands the 7th Civil Support Command and it has four colonel-level commands. Of the colonel-level commands, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade and 7th Army Warrior Training Brigade are brigades by design while the 209th Army Liaison Team and 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe are task organized as brigades for mission command purposes. In addition to colonel-level commands, the 7th Civil Support Command has one civil support team, the 773rd Civil Support Team, that reports directly to the headquarters. To understand the commands current organization, a thorough review of its units and capabilities are discussed.

361st Civil Affairs Brigade Units. The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade activated on 16 September 2010 as one of only two civil affairs units not under the command of the

United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and the only civil affairs unit permanently stationed on foreign soil. As a civil affairs brigade not under the command of USACAPOC, a condition of the approval of the structure was that USACAPOC would have a training and readiness oversight relationship.⁵ The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade is composed of a brigade headquarters company, 457th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 89th Chaplain Detachment. The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade headquarters has 110 Soldiers. The 457th Civil Affairs Battalion is composed of a 75-Soldier headquarters company and four 32-Soldier civil affairs line companies. The 89th Chaplain Detachment is a two-man capability consisting of a chaplain and chaplain's assistant. The 89th Chaplain Detachment is part of the brigade for mission command purposes only.

The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade primary purpose is to conduct civil affairs activities in support of USAREUR. As the only civil affairs brigade forward stationed, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade can respond quickly to a variety of contingencies to improve United States Government actions focused at civilians, public services, and vital government infrastructure.⁶ As reserve component Soldiers living and working in Europe, many or most of the 7th Civil Support Command troop program unit (TPU) Soldiers are proficient in another language other than English. In addition to this inherent language capability within the 7th Civil Support Command, all civil affairs officer and enlisted positions within the brigade are coded with a language requirement. Due to the difficulty of sustaining proficiency in a large number of languages, the brigade chose to limit the number of languages to four; French, Russian, Portuguese, and Turkish.⁷ While the brigade is a United States European Command (EUCOM) asset, the 7th Civil Support Command

chose the Portuguese language with the specific purpose of supporting United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).⁸

7th Warrior Training Brigade Units. The 7th Warrior Training Brigade, formerly the 3747th Multifunctional Training Brigade, is authorized 89 Soldiers in a headquarters company, schools battalion, training support battalion, non-commissioned officer (NCO) academy, and one subordinate unit; the 88th Chaplain Detachment.⁹ The brigade provides military occupational specialty (MOS) reclassification training in MOS 42A (Human Resource Specialist), MOS 88N (Transportation Specialist), and MOS 92Y (Supply Specialist).¹⁰ The MOS list for reclassification training has stayed relatively unchanged throughout the transformation. Since MOS 38B (Civil Affairs Specialist) is the largest in the 7th Civil Support Command, the brigade has pursued the ability to train the MOS but each request has been disapproved.

The brigade provides NCO professional development training by offering reserve component versions of the Warrior Leader Course, Advanced Leader Course, and the Senior Leader Course. The Warrior Leader Course, formerly the Primary Leadership Development Course, is the first NCO professional development course an enlisted Soldier may attend.¹¹ The Advanced Leader Course, formerly the Basic NCO Course or BNCOC, is MOS specific and focused at skills necessary for Sergeants and Staff Sergeants to lead at the squad-level.¹² The Senior Leader Course, formerly the Advanced NCO Course or ANCOC, is MOS specific and focused at skills necessary for Sergeants First Class to lead at the platoon-level.¹³ For both Advanced and Senior Leader Courses, the 7th Army Warrior Training Brigade teaches the phase one or common core that is the same for each MOS.

In addition to NCO professional development, the 7th Warrior Training Brigade provides officer education system (OES) professional development training through the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course. The ILE course is primarily for Majors and attendees must be Captains Career Course graduates. The ILE course is open to active and reserve component officers. The 7th Warrior Training Brigade has also fielded mobile training teams (MTT) to teach ILE to deployed Soldiers in places such as Kosovo.¹⁴

The 7th Warrior Training Brigade also conducts the Army Basic Instructor Course (ABIC), formerly known as the Total Army Instructor Training Course, to train Army instructors (active, reserve, and civilian) to deliver battle-focused training in Army schools.¹⁵ The course trains promotable Sergeants and above and those that complete the course will be awarded the Instructor Additional Skill Identifier.¹⁶ By conducting the course internally, the brigade is able to maintain the number of trained instructors necessary to facilitate its own training courses.

The 7th Warrior Training Brigade also provides mission command to the two-man 88th Chaplain Detachment. The 88th Chaplain Detachment is composed of a Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant that provide religious support to the force. Although the 7th Warrior Training Brigade is a subordinate unit of the 7th Civil Support Command, it is under the operational control of the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) in Grafenwoehr, Germany.¹⁷

209th Army Liaison Team Units. With a colonel as commander, the 209th Army Liaison Team functions both as an army liaison team for deployment purposes and as a brigade headquarters for mission command purposes. The 209th Army Liaison Team

functions as the largest brigade with eight subordinate units and undoubtedly the most diverse in missions and skill sets. The 209th Army Liaison Team mission commands two civil support teams, one public affairs detachment, one forward engineer support team – advance (FEST-A), one human resources company, and three movement control teams.

The 209th Army Liaison Team was the first army liaison team activated in the Army Reserve.¹⁸ An army liaison team conducts liaison support to a Joint Task Force or higher when deployed in support of overseas contingency operations.¹⁹ The 209th Army Liaison Team is authorized 19 Soldiers in its current configuration. The 209th will convert into a digital liaison detachment in September 2013. This conversion will increase the team's authorized strength to 30 Soldiers and provide a robust liaison capability in the areas of operations/maneuver, intelligence, fire support, logistics, and air/missile defense.

There are three lieutenant colonel-level commands subordinate to the 209th Army Liaison Team. The first, the 772nd Civil Support Team, is located in Vicenza, Italy. It is authorized 22 Soldiers with a majority of those being TPU positions. The National Guard equivalent organization has 22 positions manned by full-time National Guard Soldiers.²⁰ The MOS structure of the Army Reserve and National Guard civil support teams are very similar and have only minor modifications. Due to the civil support team equipment cost, the 7th Civil Support Command chose to field all of the equipment to only the 773rd Civil Support Team since it was manned 100% with Active Guard Reserve Soldiers. The review of civil support team missions is during the 773rd Civil

Support Team discussion. Currently, the 772nd Civil Support Team plans to convert into the 2500th Digital Liaison Detachment in September 2013.

The second, the 774th Civil Support Team, is located in Kaiserslautern, Germany. Like the 772nd, it has 22 authorized positions with a majority being TPU Soldiers. In addition, like the 772nd, it does not possess an analytical lab and some other specialized equipment that the 7th Civil Support Command fielded only to the 773rd Civil Support Team. The review of a civil support team mission is during the 773rd Civil Support Team discussion. The major difference in the 772nd and 774th Civil Support Teams is in the responsibility for mission command. The 772nd Civil Support Team has no subordinate units. The 774th Civil Support Team has one subordinate company, the 406th Human Resources Company. The 406th Human Resources Company provides human resources technical support and postal operations along with command and control of three subordinate units.²¹ The 406th Human Resources Company's three subordinate units are the 793rd Movement Control Team, 1172nd Movement Control Team, and the 1177th Movement Control Team. According to Army Field Manual 4-01.30, a movement control team's mission is "movement control of personnel, equipment, sustainment supplies and the coordination of bulk fuel and water transportation at pipeline and take-off points."²² All of the subordinate units within the 774th Civil Support Team are located in Kaiserslautern, Germany. The location of the units appears to have played a considerable role in the mission command relationships.

The third lieutenant colonel-level unit mission commanded by the 209th Army Liaison Team is the 589th Engineer Detachment. The 589th Engineer Detachment is considered a FEST-A. According to Army Field Manual 3-34, a FEST-A "is a

deployable team that provides infrastructure assessment; engineer planning and design; and environmental, geospatial, and other technical engineering support (from theater army to brigade echelon) and augments the staff at those echelons.”²³ The 589th Engineer Detachment is authorized seven officers and one enlisted Soldier.

The final subordinate unit of the 209th Army Liaison Team is the 221st Public Affairs Detachment. The 221st Public Affairs Detachment is authorized one officer and seven enlisted Soldiers. According to Army Field Manual 46-1, a captain commands a public affairs detachment that “provides direct public affairs support to units deployed in support of combined or joint operations.”²⁴

196th Medical Support Unit-Europe Units. The final colonel-level command in the 7th Civil Support Command is the 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe. The 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe is located in Mannheim, Germany and is authorized 22 officers and 25 enlisted Soldiers.²⁵ The 196th provides mission command to one subordinate unit and medical support to the 7th Civil Support Command, European Regional Medical Command, and USAREUR.²⁶ The 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe has one subordinate command, the 771st Civil Support Team. The 771st Civil Support Team is located in Bamberg, Germany and is authorized seven officers and 15 enlisted Soldiers.²⁷ Like the 772nd and 774th Civil Support Teams, a majority of the positions within the unit are for TPU Soldiers with little full-time support. Also like the 772nd and 774th Civil Support Teams, the 771st does not have a full complement of equipment due to the extreme cost.

773rd Civil Support Team. Besides brigades, the only direct reporting unit to the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters is the 773rd Civil Support Team. Of the four

civil support teams within the 7th Civil Support Command, the 773rd functions the most like a traditional WMD-CST that one would find in the National Guard. Like a WMD-CST, the 773rd Civil Support Team has only Active Guard Reserve Soldiers. However, unlike a WMD-CST, Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve Soldiers are a federal force serving under Title 10, United States Code, Section 12301(d).²⁸ The 773rd Civil Support Team is located at Rhine Ordnance Barracks in Kaiserslautern, Germany and is authorized seven officers and 15 enlisted Soldiers.²⁹

The 773rd Civil Support Team has specialist in operations, logistics/personnel, communications, medical/analytical support, survey, and decontamination.³⁰ Unlike the other civil support teams within the command, the 773rd has a full complement of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) equipment, including the Analytical Laboratory System. According to Army Field Manual 3-11.22 (Weapons of Mass Destruction Support Team Operations), the civil support team's Analytical Laboratory System "is the primary platform for field laboratory analysis, and it is the single most significant difference between the WMD-CST and other response agencies and organizations."³¹ The Analytical Laboratory System is composed of commercial off-the-shelf equipment used by the medical/analytical support personnel to conduct analysis of chemical/biological warfare agents as well as analysis of toxic industrial material and chemicals at the location of the incident to identify potential hazards.³² The Analytical Laboratory System design limits its use primarily to modern nations with an improved road network.³³ Therefore, the use of the Analytical Laboratory System capability in an austere environment may be problematic.

Critique of the 7th Civil Support Command Mission and Structure

There is no unit organization or mission that is completely perfect. The goal of this critique is to highlight those missions or areas within the unit where improvement can or should be considered. As good stewards of the nation's resources, the Army owes this type of critical review to the government and its citizens. This type of critique is particularly timely with the domestic economic problems, large national debt, ballooning federal budget deficits, and declining resources available for the Department of Defense.

After review of the 7th Civil Support Command in depth, there are a considerable number of issues inherent in the mission and organization that need to be improved. In all, there are six different issues, if addressed, which could improve the unit's usefulness and support to EUCOM, AFRICOM, and the nation. These issues are the 7th Civil Support Command name itself, mission or focus, use of civil support teams overseas, span of control, institutional training capability, and excess mission command capacity.

First, what is a civil support command? According to Joint Publication 3-28 (Civil Support) dated September 14, 2007, civil support is defined as "Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities."³⁴ With that being said, it is obvious that Department of Defense civil support operations is conducted within states, territories, and possessions of the United States to support local civil authorities. With the 7th Civil Support Command entirely stationed on foreign soil, it is not conducting civil support as defined by Joint Publication 3-28.

With current doctrinal definitions of civil support not supporting the 7th Civil Support Command naming convention, those personnel from outside the command, either civilian or government, are misled as far as the scope of support the unit can and is authorized to provide in a foreign environment. In addition, according to the Unified Command Plan 2011 dated 6 April 2011, there are only two Geographic Combatant Commanders that have a specific responsibility to support civil authorities and those are United States Pacific Command and United States Northern Command.³⁵ Finally, the Army G-3/5/7 has issued guidance that “civil support” is an obsolete term replaced by defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).³⁶ Therefore, the Army has a problem. The Army needs to rename the 7th Civil Support Command to an appropriate name using approved Army terminology that is consistent with its mission.

Second, should the United States Army develop structure for the specific purpose of conducting “Foreign Consequence Management?” According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01, “functionally, the missions of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and consequence management are closely related. Geographic combatant commands may use existing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief plans and response force structures to serve as the basis for the theater’s consequence management plan.”³⁷ This link between the functionality of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and consequence management is significant because it allows the use of existing resources for foreign consequence management missions. According to the 2011 National Military Strategy, the United States strategy to develop capabilities is “focused on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations.”³⁸ The guidance from the

highest levels of the military appears to suggest that the military should not develop structure that is limited in its usefulness and instead, look for ways to develop structure that is flexible and can handle a variety of mission sets.

When considering whether to develop foreign consequence management capabilities, the Department of Defense must weigh the cost to our nation and the benefit gained by our nation and its allies. According to *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, the United States spending on national defense is a “hidden export” totaling approximately \$600 billion per year.³⁹ The 2011 National Military Strategy shows concern for a reduction of defense expenditure by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁴⁰ If our allies are reducing defense expenditures and our nation is already exporting a tremendous amount of regional security through large military expenditures, the United States should not subsidize additional capability, such as in foreign consequence management, which will make our allies or any foreign government more dependent on our nation for their security. During the cold war, the United States deterred the Soviet Union in Europe through a large standing military force. Our NATO allies were very dependent on the United States for their security. While the threat of Soviet aggression is gone, our NATO allies are still dependent of the United States for much of their security. The United States should not develop any capability or assume any mission that will discourage our NATO allies or any foreign government from developing capabilities to protect themselves.

Third, with civil support being an inherent domestic military function, the support provided to civil authorities by civil support teams is an inherently domestic function as well. The 7th Civil Support Command currently has four civil support teams assigned.

Of those four, only one, the 773rd Civil Support Team, operates as a fully manned, trained, and equipped civil support team. All of the personnel in the 773rd Civil Support Team are Title 10 Active Guard Reserve Soldiers. Although the National Guard fills their WMD-CST structure with Active Guard Reserve Soldiers also, manning a Reserve Component unit entirely with active duty Soldiers is highly unusual. Normally, personnel from the Regular Army would fill this need for quick response and full-time manning. However, with the National Guard force having responsibilities to the state and under the direction of the Governor, it makes perfect sense to fill that quick response, full-time manning requirement by Title 32 Active Guard Reserve Soldiers from the National Guard. However, no requirement exists to use reserve component Active Guard Reserve Soldiers when the mission is federal in nature and executed on foreign soil.

According to Title 10, subsection 12310 (a)(1) of the United States Code, Soldiers perform Active Guard Reserve duty to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train reserve component units and personnel.⁴¹ The kinds of duty that a reserve component Soldier on active duty, except for training, can perform was expanded in Title 10, section 12314 to be any duty normally performed by active duty Soldiers except where specifically governed by law.⁴² Reserve Component Soldiers serving in federal or state Active Guard Reserve status can support preparation for emergencies and can respond to emergencies based on certain conditions defined in Title 10, subsection 12310(c), however, all of those conditions happen in the United States, its territories, or possessions.⁴³

With that being said, the 773rd Civil Support Team has four significant problems. It is conducting a civil support mission that is inherently domestic. It is manned with

Active Guard Reserve Soldiers that are not performing their primary duties as outlined in Title 10, subsection 12310(a)(1). The unit is performing a mission that is more appropriate for the regular army. Lastly, the emergency response and preparedness functions that the 773rd Civil Support Team provides can only be delivered as part of a WMD-CST and only within the United States. Therefore, non-domestic response by civil support teams is problematic unless specifically authorized by law.

Fourth, the organizational design of the 7th Civil Support Command is relatively flat. Prior to fiscal year 2010, the 7th Civil Support Command had junior officers that were commanders reporting directly to a general officer headquarters. The command took action to address this problem by conducting a mission command realignment to group all units, except for the 773rd Civil Support Team, under a colonel-level command. A major problem resulting from this mission command realignment is the apportionment of full-time support. For example, as a unit with 19 Soldiers, the 209th Army Liaison Team has a small amount of full-time support even though it is acting like a brigade headquarters.⁴⁴ On the other hand, since it is structured as a brigade headquarters, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade has a large amount of full-time support. The inequality in full-time support apportionment places undue stress on the 209th Army Liaison Team staff and jeopardizes mission accomplishment if considerable pressure is administered from above. In the end, the mission command realignment was needed but the current solution is inappropriate.

Fifth, the army school system (TASS) units in the continental United States have the capability to teach every course currently taught in Germany by the 7th Warrior Training Brigade. Although it would be an increase in temporary duty expenses and

additional days of travel, the 7th Civil Support Command and any active duty units currently using the 7th Warrior Training Brigade should send their students to the continental United States for training. In so doing, the 7th Warrior Training Brigade could be inactivated. As excess capability in a time of declining fiscal resources, the inactivation of the 7th Warrior Training Brigade would be a wise and appropriate action.

Sixth, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade has excess mission command capacity. As a unit structured as a brigade headquarters, it has a great deal of full-time support. Although a brigade generally has at least two battalions to mission command, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade has only one battalion. This excess mission command capacity allows the unit to function at less than full capacity and is a waste of resources.

Recommendations to Improve the 7th Civil Support Command

As the only forward deployed Army Reserve command entirely on foreign soil, the 7th Civil Support Command has a proud history of support to USAREUR, EUCOM, and the nation. With that being said, there are a number of adjustments that can be made to improve its organization and usefulness to USAREUR and EUCOM. Among the improvements that should be considered are changes to the command's name, mission focus, headquarters function, mission command structure, civil support teams, and 7th Warrior Training Brigade. In addition, the 7th Civil Support Command should take the lead in theater engagement for USAREUR.

First, for the Army, the term "civil support" is now obsolete and replaced by "defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)."⁴⁵ Formerly, these two terms were used interchangeably. With this recent change, the 7th Civil Support Command name is inconsistent with approved Army terminology. In addition, according to Joint Publication 3-28, civil support or DSCA is Department of Defense support to United States domestic

civilian authorities and does not mention foreign civil support.⁴⁶ To correct this problem and align the unit's name with other reserve commands, the 7th Civil Support Command's name should be changed to the 7th Mission Support Command. The use of the name "Mission Support Command" properly aligns with other reserve commands with similar responsibilities such as the 9th Mission Support Command in Hawaii and the 1st Mission Support Command in Puerto Rico. The name also avoids specificity of the mission and by design, focuses at decisive operations mission support.

Second, according to Field Manual 3-28 (Civil Support Operations), civil support or DSCA is only conducted domestically and is generally the Department of Defense's top priority mission.⁴⁷ Overseas, civil support type missions are considered stability operations. As such, the 7th Civil Support Command should not focus on the specific mission of foreign consequence management but instead on stability operations in general. With the 7th Civil Support Command's largest unit, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, focused on stability operations, there is an inherent capability within the command that should make the transition to a broader, less specific mission set relatively seamless. The change will allow the 7th Civil Support Command to focus on much more than foreign consequence management and increase the probability of the command being used for contingency operations in the future.

The third recommendation is to change the focus of the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters. The headquarters of the 7th Civil Support Command has a deployable element commonly referred to as the "incident management team." The commanding general leads the incident management team that is composed of certain members of the 7th Civil Support Command staff. The incident management team

deploys as the core of a Joint Task Force to conduct foreign consequence management. The personnel roster consists of primarily Active Guard Reserve Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians. Theoretically, the incident management team is supposed to deploy very quickly to a foreign consequence management incident site in a variety of different environments.

With the probability of deployment due to a foreign consequence management incident relatively low, the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters should transform into a theater-army contingency command post for USAREUR. Currently, USAREUR has only one theater-army contingency command post.⁴⁸ The use of the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters as a second contingency command post would provide USAREUR a great deal of security if the primary contingency command post is deployed. In addition, the transformation of the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters into a contingency command post allows the command to expand the range contingencies it is prepared to respond to include not only foreign consequence management but foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peace operations, theater security cooperation/building partner capacity, and noncombatant evacuation operations.⁴⁹ With the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters internal capabilities matching closely with those required of an Army contingency command post, it is reasonable for the headquarters to transform into a contingency command post to expand capability and capacity for USAREUR.

A contingency command post is a short notice, forward-deployable command post that provides mission command for small contingency operations.⁵⁰ All contingency command posts go through a standard certification process. A contingency

command post can mission command forces up to two brigades in size.⁵¹ A contingency command post is a table of organization and equipment (TOE) type organization that is considered approved doctrine and therefore has an authorized equipment list and basis of issue plan. In addition, as a doctrinally approved organization, justification for funding in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) should be simplified. Finally, transformation of the 7th Civil Support Command headquarters into a contingency command post will increase interoperability and interdependence with USAREUR and create an effective and efficient Army Reserve organization closely tied to its Active Army counterparts.

A fourth recommendation is to develop a deployable medical capability suitable for small-scale contingencies in stability operations. The core of this new capability can be harvested from the conversion of the 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe. This could be a preventive medicine detachment and perhaps an area medical company able to provide support to United States forces and medical readiness type support to an indigenous population. This forward deployed capability will increase the security and survivability of United States forces responding to a short-notice contingency operation.

A fifth recommendation is to improve mission command of 7th Civil Support Command subordinate units. To begin, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade should assume command of all units that have a key role in stability operations. As an example, the 589th Engineer Detachment with FEST-A capabilities and the deployable medical capability developed from conversion of the 196th Medical Support Unit-Europe. Both of these units have key stability operations roles and are well suited to be subordinate units of the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade. The brigade leadership has excess mission

command capacity since they will only mission command one civil affairs battalion and a chaplain detachment.

Lastly, a regional support group should be activated to provide mission command for lieutenant colonel-level units and below not under the command of the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade. In addition, the 209th Army Liaison Team, a colonel-level unit, should be under the administrative control of the Regional Support Group. As a colonel-level headquarters with 84 authorized positions, a regional support group can mission command between three and seven battalion size units.⁵²

When not deployed, a regional support group can provide most garrison type management functions and force protection. It can also provide oversight of subordinate unit training, mobilization, and readiness. When deployed, the unit is capable of providing critical support to a contingency base and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) support.⁵³ With the Department of Defense reducing Army combat brigades in Europe and increasing the use of rotational forces to conduct training and readiness exercises with our allies, a regional support group will support this strategy by providing mission command for Army units (active, reserve, and guard) rotating in and out of the European theater. In the end, a regional support group is much better suited to handle subordinate mission command requirements than an army liaison team.

The sixth recommendation is to inactivate or convert all four civil support teams within the 7th Civil Support Command. Currently, the command is requesting the inactivation or conversion of three of the four civil support teams. The only civil support team slated to remain within the command is the Active Guard Reserve pure 773rd Civil

Support Team. Civil support teams do extremely well in domestic operations and are not well suited for overseas operations, especially in an austere environment. This is particularly true for the Analytical Laboratory System vehicle.

When the United States or its allies need civil support teams overseas, National Guard WMD-CSTs can respond in a predictable manner by placing them in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. This method of meeting our allies' needs is particularly efficient since it will encourage National Guard WMD-CSTs to work closely with our allies and bring home best practices that can protect our own citizens. When WMD-CSTs deploy overseas, states can mitigate risk, in case of disasters, by having mutual aid agreements with neighboring states.

The seventh recommendation is to inactivate the 7th Warrior Training Brigade and use the structure to support the activation of other units. Like all other units in the Army Reserve, the 7th Civil Support Command should leverage the training capabilities within the continental United States to train its Soldiers. By doing so, the command will remain focused on building and sustaining operational capability.

The final recommendation is to activate a theater engagement battalion to support the European theater of operations. As the lead element, this unit will manage and perform theater security cooperation and partnership building activities for the theater army. The theater engagement battalion will be a lieutenant colonel-level command with 33 authorized positions. Each battalion will have a five-person headquarters, a seven- person battalion staff/staff training team, and three seven-person training teams.⁵⁴ With the 7th Civil Support Command actively engaged in a multitude of theater security cooperation activities each year and having an inherent

language capability, the activation of a theater engagement battalion enhances existing capabilities and effectively uses reserve component structure.

Conclusion

As the only Army Reserve command forward stationed entirely on foreign soil, the 7th Civil Support Command holds a unique position within the reserve components of the Army. With that being said, the reduction of two Army brigades in Europe looming in the near future, USAREUR's dependence on the 7th Civil Support Command's many capabilities will be greater than ever. Although many issues exist with its current organization, the recommendations presented provide solutions to create an efficient and effective unit with increased flexibility to meet a variety of demands in a complex operational environment. The result will be a 7th Mission Support Command with expanded capabilities to provide mission command, theater engagement and stability operations for the theater army.

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